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I. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court first held public assistance to religious
schools unconstitutional in 1971 in Lemon v. Kurtzman.' From
then until now the concept of "pervasively sectarian" has played
a central role in "parochaid" jurisprudence; every holding
against "direct" aid has rested upon it as a necessary premise.2
"Pervasively sectarian" refers to the assertedly religious
("sectarian") character of the entire curriculum at parochial
schools." Religion, it is said, so permeates the whole educational
program that "direct aid" to any aspect of that program
inescapably aids religion itself.4 And that, it is said, violates the
Establishment Clause!
Because aid statutes typically aim to foster only secular
education-maps, field trips, secular books, guidance servicesbranding schools "pervasively sectarian" makes it possible for
Justices so inclined to find an Establishment Clause violation. A
bare majority of the Supreme Court sidestepped "pervasively
sectarian" while upholding the Cleveland voucher program in
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. Those five Justices decided that public
money went to parochial schools due to parents' genuine
"private choice."7 No "direct aid" to religious schools occurred at
all.

1. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
2. E.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (holding unconstitutional a program to
fund public employees teaching in parochial schools); Freedom from Religion Found. v.
Bugher, 249 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2001) (striking down a state program giving religious
schools aid in obtaining telecommunications access because the state could not ensure
that the funds would be used solely for secular purposes).
3. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 850 (2000) (citing Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 365-66 (1975)).
4. Meek, 421 U.S. at 365-66 ("Even though earmarked for secular purposes, when
[direct aid] flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial
portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission, state aid has the
impermissible primary effect of advancing religion.") (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734, 743 (1973)).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion ....
").
6. 122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002).
7. Id. at 2467-68.
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"Pervasively sectarian" was still important in Zelman. The
Supreme Court majority, comprised of the Mitchell v. Helm,8
plurality and Justice O'Connor, did not deny that the recipients'
schools were "pervasively sectarian." The District Court explicitly
reached that conclusion.9 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's ruling, implicitly but necessarily adopting the
"pervasively sectarian" conclusion, as did the four Zelman
dissenters on the Supreme Court."'
The "pervasively sectarian" concept-the essential link
between "parochaid" and unconstitutionality-is nevertheless
under fire. In Mitchell, four Justices abandoned the "pervasively
sectarian" category." Justice Thomas, writing for Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Rehnquist, traced the concept to a "shameful
pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow.' 2 That "pedigree"
was a history, going back at least to the 1870s, of "pervasive
hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general,"
and "it was an open secret that 'sectarian' was code for
'Catholic." ' 3 This "doctrine," Justice Thomas concludes, was
"born of bigotry," and "should be buried now."'14 Thus, "direct
aid" programs remain presumptively unconstitutional, unless
one of the Zelman dissenters-or Justice O'Connor-abandons
the concept of "pervasively sectarian." This article supports such
abandonment by showing that the "pervasively sectarian" theory
presents an unconstitutional stereotype of Catholic belief and
practice.

II. ZELMANAND "PERVASIvELY SECTARIAN"
The Simmons-Harris v. Zelman District Court found that at the
start of the 1999-2000 school' year, forty-six of fifty-six
participating
schools-about
eighty-two
percent-were
8. 530 U.S. 793 (2000). Justice Thomas wrote the opinion of the Court, in which
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Rehnquistjoined. Id.
9. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999) [hereinafter
Simmons-HarrisI].

10. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 969 (6th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter
Simmons-Harris If](Ryan, J., concurring and dissenting) ("[T]he majority devotes
considerable attention to the mission statements of several religious schools, which
indicate the pervasively religious character of their programs."). The Zelman Supreme
Court dissenters were Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2460.
11. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 826-29 (Thomas,J., concurring).
12. Id. at 828.
13. Id.
14. Id.
at 829.
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religiously affiliated. 15 More than sixty percent were Roman
Catholic. Given these statistics, the District Court expressly
found that "parents do not have a genuine choice between
sending their children to sectarian or nonsectarian schools
because sectarian schools overwhelmingly predominate."1 7 The
District Court found that Ohio's program was "virtually
indistinguishable" from the tuition reimbursement program the
Supreme Court struck down in Committeefor Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,'s in which the majority of benefited
schools were also sectarian.' 9 "A program that is so skewed
toward religion," the court concluded, "necessarily results in
indoctrination attributable to the government and provides
financial incentives to attend religious schools. For both of these
reasons, the court finds the Program to be in violation of the
20
Establishment Clause.,
From start to finish, the District Court's argument rested upon
the view that the Cleveland schools involved were "pervasively
sectarian." In its opinion, the District Court explicitly paid
homage to Bowen v. Kendrick: "One way in which direct
government aid might have that [primary] effect [of
impermissibly advancing religion] is if the aid flows to
institutions that are 'pervasively sectarian. ' ' ,2 By essentially
affirming the District Court's reasoning, the Sixth Circuit relied
equally upon the "pervasively sectarian" view. As Judge Ryan
noted in his opinion: "The majority.., attempts to support its
view ... by utilizing the transparent argument that this statute
should be struck down because
the religious schools in the
22
program are too religious."

III. "PERVASIVELY SECTARIAN" IN THE SUPREME COURT
The District Court and Sixth Circuit naturally sought
guidance from the Supreme Court's decisions on school aid,
15. Simmons-Hartisl, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836-37 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
16. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2482 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (noting that thirty-five of the fifty-six participating schools were Catholic).
17. Simmons-Harris1, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 864.
18. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
19. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 768 (noting that approximately eighty-five percent were
church-affiliated).
20. Simmons-Harris1, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 865.
21. Id. at 853 (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1988)).
22. Simmons-Harris 11, 234 F.3d 945, 969 (6th. Cir. 2000) (Ryan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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which, as a matter of fact and as a matter of explicit analytical
reliance, have concerned Catholic schools. The term has never
acquired another referent: the Court has never deemed a
college to be "pervasively sectarian," and no non-Catholic K-12
school has figured independently in any decided case. Justice
Thomas noted in Mitchell that the term was "coined" when it
"could be applied almost exclusively to Catholic parochial
24
schools.,

Although the Court did not use the phrase, the concept of
"pervasively sectarian" first figured in a denial of aid to private
schools in 1971, in Lemon. The Lemon Court abandoned the
conclusion, stated just three years earlier in Board of Education v.
Allen, that the secular education in religious schools was
autonomous from religious training. Relying upon Pierce v.
Society of Sisters,25 the Allen court also said that the State had a
legitimate interest in the competent teaching of non-religious
subjects in parochial schools. 2

7

The Allen court never denied,

although it did not explicitly affirm, that the Catholic schools in
Pierce (or in Allen) had an integrated, religious mission. They
were, as the opinion for the Court by Justice White repeatedly
said, "parochial" schools.2 s But the Court chose to rest its analysis
not upon the overall mission or identity of the schools, but upon
23. In Everson v. Board of Education,Justice Rutledge reminded the Court that all of
the affected pupils attended Catholic schools. Everson, 330- U.S. 1, 30 n.7 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). Ninety-five percent of the students in the Rhode Island
program invalidated in Lemon attended Catholic schools. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 608 (1971). In the Pennsylvania program, ninety-six perqent were church-related
schools, and "most" of them were Catholic. Id. "Practically all" o the affected students in
Nyquist, the Court wrote, were Catholic. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 768. In Meek, the Court
recognized that seventy-five percent of the affected Pennsylvania schools were churchrelated, and further observed that the beneficiaries of the challenged program there
were mostly Catholic. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 364 (1975). In Wolman v. Walter,
the figure, according to the Court, was ninety-two percent enrollment in Catholic
schools. 433 U.S. 229, 234 (1977). Interestingly, Board of Education v. Allen, which upheld
aid to nonpublic schools, is an exception: the Court's opinion did not explicitly refer to
the percentage of beneficiaries who were Catholic. The Allen court said only that twentypercent of all New York school children-some 900,000-attended non-public schools.
Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 n.9 (1968). The District Court in Mitchell found
that of forty-six participating schools, forty-one were religiously affiliated (as of 1986-87).
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 803 (2000). Thirty-four participating schools were
Catholic. Id. The court expressly found, after reviewing some thirty-five exhibits, that the
Catholic schools were "pervasively sectarian." Id. at 904.
24. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829.
25. See Allen, 392 U.S. at 248.
26. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
27. See Allen, 392 U.S. at 245.
28. See, e.g., id. at 238.
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the autonomy of secular training in them.' After Allen, the way
was open for substantial state aid to assist religious schools, all
the way up to the cost of the secular education provided
(alongside religious training) in them.
Beginning in Lemon, the Supreme Court shifted the focus of
its church-state analysis from the public good-secular
instruction-provided by parochial schools, to the overall
"mission" of those schools. At the same time, the Court decided
to consider them not simply as private or parochial (as it had in
Allen), but as Catholic.""
A fallacious argument brought about this unexplained shift in
focus. Writing separately in Lemon, Justice Brennan expressed
the new focal point, which the Court adopted in Meek v. Pittenger
"[T] he secular education those [Catholic] schools provide goes
hand in hand with the religious mission that is the only reason for
the schools' existence. Within the institution, the two are
inextricably intertwined.'
More recently, the Fifth Circuit
' only to have a
adopted this view in Helms v. Picard,"
plurality of
3
the Supreme Court reject it in Mitchell." But the Sixth Circuit in
Zelman explicitly eschewed the Mitchell plurality in favor of
Justice O'Connor's concurrence: "[Justice O'Connor] found
'the plurality's approval of actual diversion of government aid to
religious indoctrination in tension with our precedents and ...
unnecessary to decide the instant case.' ' 3 4 In effect, the Sixth
Circuit returned to the Meek view, necessarily considering the
Meek statement-let us call it Proposition 1-inconsistent with
Allen's statement, which we shall call Proposition 2: "the
processes of secularand religious trainingare [not] so intertwined
that secular textbooks furnished to students by the public are in
fact instrumental in the teaching of religion.","
29. See id. at 247-48 ("[P]arochial schools are performing, in addition to their
sectarian function, the task of secular education.").
30. See, e.g.,
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971) ("[T]he District Court
concluded that the parochial schools constituted 'an integral part of the religious
mission of the Catholic Church.' The various characteristics of the schools make them 'a
powerful vehicle for transmitting the Catholic faith to the next generation."').
31. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 341, 366 (1975) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 657
(Brennan,.J., concurring)) (emphasis added).
32. 151 F.3d 347, 355 (5th Cir. 1998).
33. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
34. Simmons-Harris I, 234 F.3d 945, 957 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Mitchell, 530 U.S. at
837-38 (O'Connor,J. concurring)).
35. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 n.9 (1968) (emphasis added, in both
cases).
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The truth is that Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 are not
inconsistent; they both may be true. In fact, if "religious mission"
is defined according to Catholic, not state, doctrine, both are
true. A glance at Propositions 1 and 2 suggests the overlooked
possibility: secular education, delivered in its full integrity and as
competently as in public schools, may constitute a part of
Catholic schools' "religious mission." Let me explain.
Catholics consider their hospitals, social services agencies, and
schools to be "institutional ministries." They all have a specific
Catholic mission or identity. This is just as true of Catholic
colleges (none of which have been found to be "pervasively
sectarian") as it is of Catholic grade schools. But this hardly
implies that surgeons at Catholic hospitals do sectarian surgery,
or that physics professors at Catholic colleges teach Catholic
physics. Mother Teresa of Calcutta ran hospices that had a
religious mission, but they were still just hospices. Up until a few
years ago, religious brothers of Holy Cross supplied fresh food
from farms near South Bend for the dining pleasures of Notre
Dame students. These dedicated men had a specific mission
within the overall religious mission of the University of Notre
Dame, but they were still farmers. There was nothing sectarian
about their soybeans.
The Meek Court drew attention to the alleged compound of
secular and sectarian when it said that "[t]he very purpose of
many of those schools is to provide an integrated secular and
religious education. '"" Granted, but "integrated" need not mean,
and in Catholic usage does not mean, the introduction of
doctrine into math or geography class. The Lemon Court noted
that the District Court in that case had concluded that "the
parochial school system was 'an integral part of the religious
mission of the Catholic Church.' 37 Granted, but hospitals and
colleges are too, yet neither has been deemed "pervasively
sectarian."
Nothing said here implies that it cannot be the case that
secular subjects in some religious schools are vehicles for
indoctrination, or that all secular subjects are autonomous from
religious instruction in all types of religious schools. A school
which taught as science the biblical account of a seven-day
36. Meek, 421 U.S. at 366.
37. Lemon v.Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 609 (1971) (quoting DiCenso v. Robinson, 316
F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970)).
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creation would, to that extent, "sectarianize" (to invent a term)
science. But Catholics do not believe in a young earth; they do
not teach Creation Science." One simply cannot infer from the
fact that a Catholic school (or college or hospital or orphanage)
has an integrated purpose and a Catholic identity-call it a
"religious mission"-that all or most (or much, in some cases)
that happens therein is tantamount to religious instruction.
There are two premises in Proposition 1. First, Catholic
schools have a "religious mission." Second, this "religious
mission" is the "only reason" for their existence. Assuming that
Catholic schools have a "religious mission" (given the generality
of the term, it is clear that they do), it is odd to add that it is the
"only reason" for their existence. It is odd because once one
states the "mission" of a Catholic school-or of any other
institution, for that matter-one has stated its reason for
existence. That is generally what a "mission" constitutes.
One reading of the statement that the schools have a
"religious mission" that is the "only reason" for their existence is
that religious instruction predominates in the school. Taken
most straightforwardly, this statement would imply the
unconstitutionality of Catholic schools' state certification, within
the terms of compulsory attendance laws. It would be like
certifying a vacation Bible school as a summer session of
required elementary education. But no one argues that Catholic
schools should be decertified. Catholic schools deliver the
curriculum and other services required by public authority. This
premise of Allen has never been questioned. Moreover, if
indoctrination were the predominant function of the Catholic
school, non-Catholics would have little reason to enroll. Few
would. But Catholic schools, especially in urban areas, enroll

38. See Christus Rex Information Service, To Academicians: Truth Cannot Contradict
Truth (Oct. 23, 1996), at http://www.christusrex.org/wwwl/news/I0-96/eslO-23-96.html
(last visited Nov. 15, 2002) (noting that Pope John Paul 11deemed "'Humani Generis,"'
considered the doctrine of evolutionism as a serious hypothesis, worthy of a more deeply
studied investigation and reflection on a par with the opposite hypothesis.... Today ....
new knowledge leads us to recognize in the theory of evolution more than a
hypothesis."). For an explanation of young-earth creation science, see HENRY MADISON
MORRIS & GARY E. PARKER, WHAT ISCREATION SCIENCE? (1987).
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substantial numbers of non-Catholic students.39 In many
cases, a
40
faith.
Catholic
the
profess
not
do
students
of
majority
IV. AUTHENTIC CATHOLIC DOCTRINE ON EDUCATION:
SCHOOLING BASED UPON THE GOSPEL

It is surely not the "mission" of Catholic schools to
"indoctrinate" pupils, or, to use less loaded terms, to transmit
the faith to children; less it is the "only reason" for their
existence. Indeed, a separate Catholic school system was started
in this country to protect Catholic children from the scandal of
aggressive Protestantism in the public schools. 4' Today many see
in the
Catholic
school
a disciplined,
value-centered
environment; apart from the special opportunity to learn the
Catholic faith, that is sufficient reason to enroll. This is the
picture of the voucher beneficiaries in Zelman: mostly nonCatholic, the children's families were much more interested in
academic quality and child
safety than they were in the religious
42
affiliation of the schools.
The mission of Catholic schools is first and foremost, to be a
school. Here is the mission of a school-any K-1 2 school-as the
Catholic Church authoritatively describes it:
Among all educational instruments the school has a special
importance. It is designed not only to develop with special care
the intellectual faculties but also to form the ability to judge
rightly, to hand on the cultural legacy of previous generations,
to foster a sense of values, to prepare for professional life.
Between pupils of different talents and backgrounds it
promotes friendly relations an fosters a spirit of mutual
understanding; and it establishes as it were a center whose
work and progress must be shared together by families,
teachers, associations of various types that foster cultural, civic,

39. NAT. CATHOLIC EDuc. AssoC., CATHOLIC SCHOOL HIGHLIGHTS 2001-2002, at

http://www.ncea.org/newinfo/nceacommunications/cswhighs2002.asp.
40. Id.; see also NAT. CATHOLIC EDUC. ASsOC., U.S. CATHOLIC SECONDARY SCHOOLS, at

http://www.ncea.org/newinfo/nceacommunications/secfact.asp.
41. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2503-04 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the inclusion of religion in public school causes contention as
competing "religious groups struggle with one another to obtain the Government's
stamp of approval" and describing the persecution Catholics faced because of the
Protestant nature of America's early public schools); see also David B. Tyack, Onward
ChristianSoldiers: Religion in the American Common School, in HISTORY AND EDUCATION: THE
EDUCATIONAL USES OF THE PAST 217-226 (Paul Nash ed. 1970).

42. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2485 (SouterJ., dissenting).

10
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and religious life, as well as by civil society and the entire

human community."
The defining characteristic of the Catholic school is "a special
atmosphere animated by the Gospel spirit of freedom and
charity. 44 This, according to bishops and cardinals assembled at
the Second Vatican Council speaking in union with the Pope, is
the "prototype," to which "all schools that are in any45 way
dependent on the Church must conform as far as possible.,
In its December 1997 document, The Catholic School on the
Threshold of the Third Millennium, the Vatican Congregation for
Catholic Education (the highest Church authority, other than
the Pope, on Catholic schools) said the goal of the Catholic
schools is "the promotion of the [whole] human person,"
including the intellectual, moral and spiritual spheres.4' The
Catholic school mission statements quoted by the District Court
in Mitchell for instance, echo this aim: "only in such a school can
[pupils] experience learning and living fully integrated in the
light of faith."47 The students' secular education is enhanced
through the development of their faith in Christ. The mission
statements must be understood according to the mind of the
Church, not the mind of the civil authorities.
Here, then, is an authentically Catholic articulation of an
alternative to "pervasively sectarian": "a special atmosphere
animated by the Gospel spirit of freedom and charity., 4 This is
the Catholic meaning-and given the cases, the only relevant
constitutionally available meaning-of "religious mission." Can
one infer from the pervasive spirit of freedom and charity that
secular teaching is, after all, "so intertwined" with religion that
aid to Catholic schools impermissibly advances religion? Does
this "atmosphere" supply the premise missing from Proposition
1?
43. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON CHRISTIAN EDUCATION GIAvISSIMuM
E1UCATIONJS § 5 (1965), available at http://www.ewtn.com/library/COUNCILS/
V2EDUC.HTM (last visited Sept. 20, 2002) [hereinafter GE].
44. Id. § 8.
45. Id. § 9.
46. See CONGREGATION FOR CATHOLIC EDUCATION, THE CATHOLIC SCHOOL ON THE
THRESHOLD OF THE THIRD MILLENNIUM § 9 (1997), available at http://www.vatican.va/
roman_curia/congregations/ccatheduc/document-s/rcconccatheducdoc27041998_
school200_en.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2002) [hereinafter THRESHOLD].
47. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 905 n.24 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing the St.
Anthony School Handbook).
48. See sura note 44 and accompanying text.
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I identify three major components of the atmosphere of
freedom and charity. Together with explicit instruction in the
Catholic faith and practice-which occurs in separate, distinct
religion class-they constitute the distinguishing Catholic
element of the Church's K-12 schools." None of these
components, separately or combined, justifies the inference that
secular subjects are infused with sectarian content. In fact, they
demonstrate precisely the correctness of Proposition 2: "the
processes of secular and religious training are [not] so
intertwined that secular textbooks furnished to students by the
public are in fact instrumental in the teaching of religion.' ' °
V. THE INTEGRITY OF SECULAR EDUCATION IS NOT UNDERMINED
BY THE GOSPEL ATMOSPHERE OF FREEDOM AND CHARITY

A. Instruction and Trainingin the CatholicFaith
The District court in Zelman examined evidence of how
Catholic schools engage in a substantial amount of religious
education and training, including religion classes, sacramental
preparation, regular worship, and some religiously oriented
extracurricular activities' However, no case has held that the
presence of a sizable amount of explicit religious training makes
a school "pervasively sectarian." That concept instead concerns
(alleged) spillover of religion into secular subjects, such as math
and geography. 2 It has nothing to do with the intensity of
religious courses or devotions, or with their number, or even
with the ratio of such pious undertakings to "secular"
instructions.

49. Another thing that distinguishes Catholic schools is the significantly higher
standardized test scores when compared to public schools. See Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2482-83 (2002) (Thomas, J.,concurring) (noting that
Cleveland's Catholic schools score significantly higher on Ohio proficiency tests than
students at Cleveland public schools. Of Cleveland eighth graders taking the 1999 Ohio
proficiency test, ninety-five percent in Catholic schools passed the reading test, whereas
only fifty-seven percent in public schools passed. Also, seventy-five percent of Catholic
school students passed the math proficiency test, compared to only twenty-two percent of
public school students.).
50. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968).
51. See Simmons-Harris 1, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837-38 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (citing several
religious schools' handbooks).
52. In Tilton v. Richardson, the Court held that Catholic colleges and universities were
not pervasively sectarian because religion was not likely to permeate the area of secular
education. 403 U.S. 672, 687 (1971).
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It is true that Catholic schools are subject to the authority of
the Church's pastors despite the autonomy of secular subjects.
This is because the faith is taught. It is Catholic doctrine that
wherever the faith is taught, there is episcopal responsibility.
This is also true at the college level. Yet no Catholic college has
ever been deemed "pervasively sectarian." For example,
according to the law of the Catholic Church, the bishop of any
diocese is solely responsible for the teaching of the faith in that
place. This extraordinary authority stems from Catholics'
solemn belief that Jesus transmitted to the Apostles His own
divine authority, and that the Apostles left bishops as their
successors. ' Bishops therefore teach with the authority of Christ.
According to Church law, the bishop is responsible for the
welfare of Catholics in his territory. But this does not mean that
he is involved in all the Church's local activities, or that all the
Church does under his authority has to do with religion itself.
The physical plant of any large archdiocese is the size of a small
city. The many people responsible for servicing the plant
perform tasks that are indistinguishable from those their
municipal counterparts perform, even if the former work under
the Archbishop's supervision.
The Lemon court spoke of how "religious authority" pervaded
the whole Catholic school system. 5" The District Court in Mitchell
noted that the schools operated under the "general supervision"
of the local bishop and the parish pastor, and counted such
Episcopal oversight as evidence of an illicit religious-secular
compound. 57 But on a proper understanding of Catholic
doctrine, that counting is illicit. The bishop does possess a
general oversight role. But that arises, and has little meaning
apart, from his special competence as authoritative teacher of
the faith. It is either question-begging or a form of double
counting to add his authority to the explicit teaching of religion
as evidence of "pervasive sectarianism." His authority is an

53. See 1983 CODE c. 375-80.
54. See id. c. 375 ("Bishops, who by divine institution succeed to the place of Apostles
through the Holy Spirit who has been given to them ....
").
55. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, DECREE CONCERNING THE PASTORAL OFFICE OF
BISHOPS
IN THE CHURCH
CHIUSTUS DOMINUS §
11
(1965),
available at

http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_cotincils/ii-vatican council/documents/vatii-decree_19651028_christus-dominns_en.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2002).
56. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617 (1971).
57. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 904 n.23 (2000) (SouterJ., dissenting).
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implication of what no one denies: Catholic schools teach the
Catholic faith.58

B. Personal Vocation
The atmosphere of freedom and charity in Catholic schools
prominently includes teachers who live out, and thereby witness
to, their "personal vocation." What is the meaning of this crucial
term? Probably no concept was more central to the renewal of
the Church accomplished at the Second Vatican Council in the
mid-1960s than that of "personal vocation." Prior to that time,
"vocation" was widely understood to refer to the callings of
priests, nuns, and brothers to the specifically religious life of
chastity, poverty, and obedience. But the Council reinvigorated
the traditional teaching, then largely obscured, that everyone
has a vocation.Y All lay persons-bricklayers, policemen,
housewives, doctors, retirees-have a vocation, a specific calling
from God to participate in building up good on earth, and
thereby storing up material for heaven."0 The critically important
thing is that vocation attaches religious meaning and
significance-indeed, the highest kind, for it has to do with what
God is calling one to do with one's life-to what are usually
mundane tasks:
But the laity, by their very vocation, seek the kingdom of God
by engaging in temporal affairs and by ordering them
according to the plan of God. They live in the world, that is, in
each and in all of the secular professions and occupations.
They live in the ordinary circumstances of family and social
life, from which the very web of their existence is woven. They
are called there by God that by exercising their proper
function and led by the spirit of the Gospel they may work for
the sanctification of the world from within as a leaven.'
The Holy Cross Brothers who cultivated soybeans near South
Bend had a personal vocation. So did all of the other Catholic

58. The bishop may also hold legal title to all the church buildings in the locale,
including grade schools. If so, then his authority pervades the schools for another reason
independent of the integrity of secular teaching.
59. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH LUMEN

GENrTuM, ch. IV, § 31 (1964), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/histcouncils/
iiVaticancouncil/documents/vat-ii_const_19641121 lumen-gentiumen.html
(last
visited Nov. 15, 2002).
60. See id.
61. Id.
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farmers in the area, as did the truckers who carried the produce
to campus, and the food service workers who prepared it. This
notion of personal vocation is basically identical to what Vice
President Gore meant when he said that "the purpose of life is
to glorify God."'' He did not mean that he would, or that anyone
should, ceaselessly preach Christian doctrine. He meant that
one should, and that he would, glorify God by doing well those
secular tasks entrusted to him. Given the deep Christian
convictions of so many Americans throughout our history, one
may suppose that members of Congress, governors, presidents,
and judges have performed their constitutional duty as a calling
from God, and as a way to praise God.
The aim of much recent Catholic theology of work and of
Catholic
engagement
with
contemporary
culture-an
engagement whose Latin term, aggiornamento, stands as one
description of the Council's whole project-is to sanctify
ordinary daily tasks. For Catholics, "sanctification" is to do
exactly what the non-Catholic does, but to serve God by doing it
well, to do it with a supernatural purpose added to the ordinary
purposes of getting the job done. A Catholic may conclude that
God wants him or her to be a farmer, a secretary, a toll collector,
or a president. In each case, a Catholic fulfills his or her
vocation by being the best secretary, or president, he or she can
be.
The Declaration on Christian Education attaches the "highest
importance" to the "vocation" of teachers, who "aid parents in
fulfilling their duties and who, as representatives of the human
community, undertake the task of education in schools."'"' The
Declaration refers not only to the Roman Catholic "community"
but to the civil community. Thus, the fact that teachers of
secular subjects in Catholic schools view themselves as serving
God does not justify labeling Catholic schools "pervasively
sectarian." This is because a Catholic teaching in a public school
would be living according to her personal vocation as much as a
Catholic teaching in a Catholic school. A teacher's vocation does
not change when she leaves public schools and begins teaching
at a Catholic school.

62. Nat Hentoff, God in School, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1999, at A19.
63. GE, supra note 43, § 5.
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An additional, and more fundamental, reason why this
important concept cannot be used to distinguish a "pervasively
sectarian" school is that it would violate the Free Exercise
Clause," as the Court interpreted it in Employment Division v.
Smit ' and Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah." Those cases
stand for the proposition that where an action is legitimately
generally prohibited, the Constitution does not require different
treatment for believers who engage in the activity for religious
reasons, or for the religious significance they see in or attach to
it .'7 The cases also stand for this corollary: Where public
authority generally permits an activity-say, slaughtering
animals-it may not discriminate against persons who would
engage in the activity for religious reasons or for the religious
significance they see in or attach to it. "It would doubtless be
unconstitutional," the Smith Court said, "to ban the casting of
'statues that are to be used for worship purposes,' or to prohibit
68
bowing down before a golden calf.,

From these cases, one thing is perfectly clear: it would violate
the Free Exercise Clause for the government to discharge or
otherwise discriminate against a public school math teacher on
the ground that the math teacher, like Al Gore, was known to
consider teaching math as his calling from God. It follows that
the presence of a similarly dedicated math teacher in a Catholic
institution, or even a number of such devout teachers, cannot
justify discrimination against that school.
C. Teachers as Moral Exemplars: Gospel Charity
The Second Vatican Council said that "teachers by their life as.
much as by their instruction bear witness to Christ, the unique
Teacher." 9 This witness is not preaching or explicit instruction
in the faith. It is the silent witness one gives by living out one's
personal vocation, by living a life of Christian charity. The more
64. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .....
65. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
66. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
67. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79; Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 531 ("[O]ur cases establish the
general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be
justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect
of burdening a particular religious practice.").
68. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-878.
69. GE, supra note 43, § 8.
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recent document on schools in the new millennium states that
"teachers and educators fulfill a specific Christian vocation and
share an equally specific participation in the mission of the
Church to the extent that it depends chiefly
on them whether
70
purposes.,
its
achieves
school
Catholic
the
These authentic teachings show that Catholic teachers are
required to be examples of the morally upright life. In the
1960s,
the
Archbishop
of
New
Orleans
publicly
"excommunicated"-declared
outside
the
Church-three
ardent segregationists.7 ' The District Court in Mitchell cited an
Archdiocesan policy by which teachers and principals might be
72
discharged for a public lifestyle contrary to church teaching.
Thus, we should expect that no segregationist or racist would
find employment in New Orleans' Catholic schools.
That teachers are expected to exhibit good character is not a
peculiarly Catholic policy. All teachers, if not most employees of
all types, are expected to be of good character. That good
character is expected to pervade Catholic schools is therefore no
evidence of a suspect sectarianism. It is probably true that a few
moral norms to which Catholic teachers must conform are not
standards to which their public counterparts must conform. An
adulterous relationship, for example, could lead to dismissal in a
Catholic school but not in all public schools. But this is not
evidence of sectarianism. For the Church teaches, as a matter of
doctrine, that moral norms such as the prohibition of adultery
are "written on the hearts" of all persons, that neither revelation
nor the teaching authority of the Church is necessary to know
that adultery is wrong. 4 Catholics believe that the immorality of
70. THRESHOLD, supra note 46, § 19 (citing GE, supra note 43, § 8).
71. Timothy A. Mitchell, A History Lesson, NEWSDAY (N.Y.),July 2, 1990, at 40.

72. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 905 n.25 (2000) (SouterJ., dissenting) ("The
Archdiocese's ... contracts of principals and teachers in its schools contain a provision
allowing for termination for lifestyle contrary to the teachings of the Roman Catholic
church.").

73. President Bush stated that Americans "always" expect teachers "to be examples to
our children, to live a live of good character." Rudi Williams, First Lady Hosts "Preparing
Tomorrow's Teachers" Conclave (Mar. 7, 2002), at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
mar2002/n03072002/2002030702_2002030702.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2002); see also
Dr. Frank Till, Building Better Character,S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.)
available at http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/education/kidsofcharacter/sfl-kctill,
o,4815662.story (last visited Nov. 15, 2002) (describing Broward County, Florida
character education program and indicating the superintendent's expectations that

teachers set an example of good character).
74. See, e.g., Romans 2:14-15;JOHN PAUL I, ENCYCLICAL LETTER VER1TATIS SPLENDER §§
75-79 (1993).
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such acts is innate in humanity, part of the natural moral law.
And all the great religious traditions in America-Christian,
Jewish, Muslim, Mormon-agree.
It is and has always been Catholic doctrine that, in matter of
what today might be called "lifestyle," everything the Church
teaches can be known by reason alone. One who wishes to show
that instead the Church teaches what reason cannot know-and
that therefore the good character of Catholic teachers is a
"sectarian" presence in the schools-would have to prove it. He
would have to engage, and refute, rational arguments by
Catholics and others that justify Catholic teachings.
D. The Propositionthat Secular Subjects are Infected With Religion is
Unproved. Evidence Given for it Amounts to a Violation of the "Content
Neutrality" the FirstAmendment Requires.

Justice Douglas said in his concurrence in Lemon that Catholic
schools "give the church the opportunity to indoctrinate its
creed delicately and indirectly, or massively through doctrinal
courses. "75 Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Everson, said that
"commingling" religious and secular teachings causes the entire
Catholic school system to be "permeat[ed]" with religion.7"
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Allen, warned about a "creeping
sectarianism [which] avoids the direct teaching of religious
doctrine but keeps the student continually reminded of the
sectarian orientation of his educators.",77 He speculated that
"[s]ome parochial schools may prefer those texts which are
liberally sprinkled with religious vignettes." 8 He cited no
evidence of the preference, and the texts challenged in Allen
were approved by the state for use in public schools. 79 If and
when the record is compiled in a lawsuit-but, mercifully, not
before-courts may have to grapple with the question of how
many "vignettes" is one too many.
That number is surely much greater than zero. The Supreme
Court has said that even public schools are not constitutionally
required to ban the study, much less the mention (in "vignettes"
or otherwise) of religion. The Court in School District of Abington
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 630-31 (1971) (DouglasJ., concurring).
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 47 (1947) (Rutledge,J., dissenting).
Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 260 n.9 (1968) (DouglasJ., dissenting).
Id.
See id. at 238-39.
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Township v. Schempp invalidated devotional reading of the Bible
in public schools. The Schempp Court stressed, however, that
the Establishment Clause did not evict religion from the
curriculum."1 Integrated into the teaching of history, civilization,
ethics, comparative religion and the like, the Ten
Commandments may appropriately be taught. 2 The upshot is
that public schools may not teach any sectarian doctrine as true,
but that teaching about religion, through storytelling or
"vignettes," is not to be confused with prohibited indoctrination.
For this reason, the many examples Justice Douglas cited of
"creeping sectarianism" (e.g., listing which signers of the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were
Catholic, and noting that Sir Edmund Hillary left a crucifix on
Mt. Everests) does not count as evidence of "indoctrination." A
public school teacher so inclined might just as well mention
such curiosities. These "vignettes" may remind younger
members of a particular minority group of the secular
achievements of their forebears, accomplishments that the
public schools may consciously slight. In any event, such cultural
and ethnic awareness is not peculiar to the Catholic schools.
Justice Douglas' spirited assertions are wide of the mark. But
they nevertheless express an important truth: Many subjects
required by state licensing authorities-history, civics and
English-do not permit elimination of the teacher's personal
interpretations; probably no subject does. No complete
objectivity or neutrality is possible; insisting otherwise is naive.
Depending upon the subject, student sophistication, and
ambition of the course, questions legitimately arise within classes
in secular subjects which cannot be answered without reference
to some point of view, some interpretive guide, some set of
evaluative criteria, outside the subject. What caused the
American Civil War? Did the Vietnam War conclude with an
honorable peace? Should a literature course include Hucklebery
Finn? If so, what should 'the teacher say about its portrayal of
African-Americans? What did the Court mean when it said in

80.
81.
82.
83.

See Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
See id. at 225.
See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. at 39, 42 (1981) (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225).
See Allen, 392 U.S. at 260 n.9 (Douglasj., dissenting).
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Brown v. Board of Education4 that African-Americans educated in
segregated schools suffered from psychological harm from the
experience? Where the state requires certain subjects to be
taught, and where those subjects call for subjective treatment by
individual teachers, a teacher's "take" does not smudge the
subject's autonomy or integrity. The subject is completed, not
compromised, by the added perspective.
Justice Douglas consistently used religiously loaded-which is
to say, very Catholic-examples, including the Crusades and the
Inquisition.5s He had a point: Teachers will interpret and
evaluate some mandated subjects. But what follows? Justice
Douglas seems to have thought that there were (wrong)
"sectarian" answers, and (right) objective answers, to the
inevitable interpretative questions. However, objectivity is not
possible here; as the Court squarely held in West Virginia State of
Education v. Barnette, there can be no politically "orthodox"
answer. " What, then, could distinguish the parochial school
teacher's viewpoint as "sectarian," and as a basis for
discriminatory treatment, from the public school teacher's
"objective" viewpoint?
It is true that teachers in Catholic schools may deal with the
inevitable subjective elements of a course in a way consonant
with Catholic teaching. That is one reason why practicing
Catholics are preferred as teachers in Catholic schools.
Nevertheless, to discriminate against institutions that adopt a
particular viewpoint on debatable interpretations of such
required subjects as history, civics, and literature is to 8violate
the
7
viewpoint neutrality required by the First Amendment.
Although the Catholic school is not a government forum of
any kind, Lamb's Chapel is still closely analogous. Here the
government certifies a school and requires it to teach certain
courses. Those subjects, then, are much like the designated
topics available for treatment in the nonpublic forum in Lamb's
Chapel. The rule of that case applies: "the government violates
the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to

84. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("To separate [African-American children] from others
of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority... in a way unlikely ever to be undone.").
85. See Allen, 392 U.S. at 260-262 (Douglas,J., dissenting).
86. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
87. See Lamb's Chapel v. Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1983).
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suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise
includible subject. ' .. Although the government is not
"suppressing" speech in this instance, the reason why it may not
suppress speech is the reason why it may not discriminate at all
against viewpoints on required subjects: the First Amendment
requires neutrality.
VI. CATHOLIC DOCTRINE FORBIDS "INDOCTRINATION" AS THAT
TERM IS USED IN THE CASES

"Indoctrination" is a term more often used in the cases than
explained in them. In Zelman, for example, Justice Stevens
repeatedly
accused
Ohio
of
paying
for
"religious
'' s:
indoctrination.
But Justice Stevens failed to explain the
notion, nor did he explain how a student population, two-thirds
of which was not Catholic, could be so readily "indoctrinated" by
teachers at Catholic schools.
The Supreme Court has often treated "inculcation" as a
synonym for "indoctrination. '' ) "Indoctrination" might therefore
mean "teaching," the transmission of a particular body of
thought-Catholicism-through lengthy instruction. If this is
the intended meaning, Catholic schools do not come close to
"pervasively" indoctrinating students. No one asserts that
Catholic schools teach religion most of the time, save
commentators who use a less wholesome meaning of
"indoctrination."
The case containing the Supreme Court's most informative
expression of what "pervasively sectarian" means did not involve
primary and secondary schools, but Catholic colleges. In
deciding that Catholic colleges were not "pervasively sectarian,"
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a plurality in Tilton v.
Richardson, opined
that
college
students
were
"less
impressionable and less susceptible to indoctrination" than
younger pupils.!' College students' "skepticism" equips them to

88. Id. at 394 (quoting Corneliau v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
89. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2484-85 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
90. E.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 414 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The
instructional materials which are subsidized ... plainly may be used to inculcate religious
values and belief."); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 843 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[I] f the religious school uses the aid to inculcate religion in its students..
the government has communicated a message of endorsement.").
91. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971).
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resist indoctrination. 2 The "internal disciplines" and "academic
freedom" of higher education courses limit the opportunity for
"sectarian influence."93 Finally, the Chief Justice observed that
church colleges sought "to evoke free and critical response from
the students."94
Along all these lines, the Chief Justice sought to compare
Catholic K-12 schools unfavorably to Catholic colleges. He made
explicit in Tilton what was often implicit, or evidently
presupposed, in the K-12 cases: religious "indoctrination" was
not the simple teaching of Catholicism. Indoctrination in
primary schools trades upon the pupils' lack of freedom and
critical reflection. 5: It did so in two ways. Either the students
were commanded to believe, or they were manipulated into
believing.96 "Indoctrination" was either heavy-handed or
insidiously subliminal.
The many unflattering judicial observations of Catholic
schools that offered to show "indoctrination" have appealed to
popular stereotypes of Catholics (not just children) as
regimented followers, commanded by their hierarchical masters.
Caricatures so gross and so harmful to another ethnic, racial, or
religious minority, are not easily located in the U.S. Reports. 7
The judicial caricature of Catholic belief and practice requires
only the following two-part rejoinder. First, the role of liberty in
any grade school child's education is limited and conditional.
The state compels them to attend school and compels all schools,
including Catholic ones, to teach certain secular courses.98
America's grade school children are present in a U.S. History
class, then, only because the state compels them to be present.99
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 672.
95. "The 'affirmative if not dominant policy' of the instruction in pre-college church
schools is 'to assure future adherents to a particular faith by having control of their
education at an early age."' Id. at 685-86 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
671 (1970)).
96. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 685-86 (suggesting that pre-college students are
"impressionable" and "susceptible" and lack "academic freedom").
97. At least, not in cases that retain respectability. Cf Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130,
141 (1872) (referring to women as "[unfit] for many of the occupations of civil life");
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896); Buck v. Bell, 247 U.S. 200, 207 (1927)
(suggesting that "imbeciles" should be sterilized).
98. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 787-88 (1973).
99. One should not pretend that public schools do not seek to mold students' minds
and hearts about a great many things. Students do not learn the virtues of socialism or
racism in American primary schools, and that is a good thing. Students have no choice
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The liberty that permits some children to attend Catholic, rather
than state, schools is not the liberty of any child; rather, it is the
liberty of parents. (No case has ever held that a child has a legal
right to attend a school the child prefers to that which his
parents chose.)
The Court first recognized the parents' constitutional right to
choose nonpublic schools in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.'O The
Catholic schools respect this liberty even more than the state
schools, at least for parents who wish their children to receive an
integrated education. This parental liberty has always been the
foundational moral imperative of Catholic educators. The
Church has always taught that parents have the primary duty
and therefore the right to direct the education of their
children.'' All educators, including those running Catholic
schools, are bound to view themselves as assisting parents'
discharge of this "primordial and inalienable" right and duty. ,2
The K-12 cases are suffused with the specter of
"indoctrination." Yet-and it does not go too far to term this
omission shocking-in no case has the Supreme Court noticed
the authoritative teaching of the Church on the most relevant
subject: religious freedom. The Fathers at the Vatican Council
said, in solemn form, that every human person has the right to
religious freedom."'" Everyone is entitled to freedom from
coercion in religious matters, by divine ordination. For God so
created people and the rest of the world that "the truth cannot
impose itself except by virtue of its own truth, or it makes its
entrance into the mind at once quietly and with power.""' "In all
but to be present as they are taught that George Washington was the father of tile
country and that Martin Luther King was a great civil rights leader.
100. The court stated:
The fidamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in the Union
repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not
the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high dtty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
101. See, e.g., CATECIIISM OFTIIE CArtOLIC CHURCH § 2223; GE, supra note 43, § 3.
102. CA TECISM OF THE CATI-HOLIC CHURCH, supra note 101, § 2221.
103. See SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM DIGNITA Is

HUMANAE § 2, available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hisLcotiicils/ii-vaticancotnicil/documents/vat-iidecl_19651207_dignitatis-hiinanaeen.htInl (last visited Nov.
23, 2(102).
104. Id. § 1.
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his activity," the Fathers add, "a man is bound to follow his
conscience in order that he may come to God, the end and
purpose of life. It follows that he is not to be forced to act in a
manner contrary to his conscience."' 5
These moral constraints upon the presentation of the faith do
not pertain only, or even particularly, to the state, as though
Catholic educators were free to move in on space Caesar
vacated. The morality of free religious belief protects everyone,
and it constrains everyone. The pertinent moral norm is that in
"spreading religious faith and in introducing religious practices
everyone [including religious communities] ought at all times to
refrain from any manner of action which might seem to carry a
hint of coercion or a kind of persuasion that would be
dishonorable or unworthy . . . ."'" Were Catholic educators to
command belief or manipulate children into accepting the faith,
they would be acting immorally. A Catholic school that
"indoctrinated" its pupils would not be Catholic.
VII. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has stated on many occasions that the
central aim of the Religion Clauses is to forestall state-sponsored
indoctrination."7 Whenever the government--directly or
indirectly, subtly or overtly-prescribes the meaning and
content of religious belief, this core command is violated. The
government may not set up a church, compose a prayer that all
are bound to recite, discriminate against a religion it deems false
or inconvenient, or favor another it deems true or helpful. Nor
may the government base adverse treatment of believers upon
its definition of what they believe. The Supreme Court has
consistently stated that civil authorities are bound to accept a
religious institution's definition of its doctrine and beliefs."' The
Court has consistently interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to
require the government to accept a sincere believer's statement
105. Id. § 3.
106. Id. § 4 (emphasis added).
107. For a discussion of the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence on this topic, see
DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, 247 F.3d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 2001).
108. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 609 (1979) (rejecting a state action that
"would appear to require a civil court to pass on questions of religious doctrine, and to
usurp the function of the commission appointed by the Presbytery .... "); Serbian
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivoievich, 426 U.S. 696, 724 (1976) ("IT]he First and Fourteenth
Amendments permit hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and
regulations for internal discipline and government ... ").
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of what he believes, no matter how strange or singular those
beliefs may seem." ' Furthermore, the government is bound to
accept the implications and inferences believers draw, even
where they appear to be illogical or unwarranted. ll
Of course, none of these holdings implies that believers are
entirely free to act upon their beliefs. The common good often
requires that religious conduct be regulated. Sometimes a
particular religious practice may justify discriminatory treatment
by the government. But the Religion Clauses lose much of their
meaning unless the government is under a constitutional duty to
accurately identify and understand the pertinent religious
beliefs or practices. It may be constitutionally legitimate for
government to discriminate among churches or religious
schools due to their engagement in political campaigning or in
racially discriminatory practices."' But the Religion Clauses
impose a high burden of proof: the government must show by
clear and convincing evidence that the beliefs and practices of
the religious group, as the believers state and interpret them, are
racially discriminatory, or do amount to electioneering. Civil
authorities are competent to decide, within limits, what
questions to ask about a religion and its practice in order to
protect the common good, but the answers must be those of the
faithful, not of the magistrate. This article has tried to show that
judicial designation of Roman Catholic schools as "pervasively
sectarian" violates this important constitutional requirement.

109. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that a Jehovah's
Witness whose religious beliefs prevented him from manufacturing weapons was denied
his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion when Indiana refused to allow him
unemployment benefits); Frazee v. Employment Security Dept., 489 U.S. 829 (1989)
(holding that a person who refused to work on Sunday on account of his religious beliefs
was unconstitutionally denied unemployment benefits).
110. See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715 ("Courts should not undertake to dissect
religions beliefs because the believer admits that he is 'struggling' with his position or
because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision that a more
sophisticated person might employ."); Frazee, 489 U.S. at 834 ("It is also true that there
are assorted Christian denominations that do not profess to be compelled by their
religion to refuse Sunday work, but this does not diminish Frazee's protection flowing
from the Free Exercise Clause .... ").
111. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that Bob
Jones did not qualify as a tax-exempt organization on accotmnt of its racially
discriminatory practices). See also I.R.C. 501(c)(3) (2002) (concerning political
campaigning).

